Try It, You'll Like It-Or Will You? The Perils of Early Free-Trial Promotions for High-Tech Service Adoption by Foubert, Bram & Gijsbrechts, Els
  
 
Try It, You'll Like It-Or Will You? The Perils of Early
Free-Trial Promotions for High-Tech Service Adoption
Citation for published version (APA):
Foubert, B., & Gijsbrechts, E. (2016). Try It, You'll Like It-Or Will You? The Perils of Early Free-Trial
Promotions for High-Tech Service Adoption. Marketing Science, 35(5), 810-826.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2015.0973
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2016
DOI:
10.1287/mksc.2015.0973
Document Version:
Accepted author manuscript (Peer reviewed / editorial board version)
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Web Appendix 
Web Appendix 1: Derivation of 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐅𝐅 , 𝐪𝐪𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐑𝐑, and 𝐔𝐔𝐑𝐑𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 
Derivation of 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 . qitF  and qitR  represent the beliefs with regard to the average match 
quality over the months of the free trial and the regular contract, respectively. Below, we derive 
the distribution of the belief qitL  with regard to the average match quality during a contract of any 
length L. First, notice that: qitL = ∑ qitt+τLτ=1 L⁄ = ∑ �qit + k ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�Lτ=1 L⁄ =qit + k ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ . 
Because qit|d, k~N(q�it, sit) (see Equations 11 and 12), we can write: 
(A.1)  E�qitL �d, k� = q�it + k ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄  and 
(A.2)  Var�qitL �d, k� = sit2 . 
On the basis of Equation 11, E�qitL �d, k� can be rewritten as: 
(A.3)  E�qitL �d, k� = sit2 ∙ � E(q0|d)Var(q0|d) + ∑ ϑiτAtτ=1�σA�2 + ∑ ϑiτDtτ=1(σD)2 + ∑ ϑiτUtτ=1(σU)2 + ∑ ϑiτWtτ=1(σW)2 � + 
    k ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ , 
where q0|d is the initial belief about the ultimate quality θi, conditional on d. Consumers derive 
q0 as q0 = q0A − d, where q0A is consumers’ initial belief about advertised quality. Indeed, prior 
to the launch of the service, consumers only receive quality signals through advertising or direct 
marketing – obviously, there are no usage or WOM signals before launch – such that any 
knowledge about the ultimate quality θi is based on what they have learned from marketing (q0A) 
and their belief with regard to the marketing bias (d). If we assume that q0A~N�q�0A, s0�, it follows 
that q0|d~N�q�0A − d, s0�. Given Expressions 10, we can now rewrite Equation A.3 as follows: 
 1 
(A.4) E�qitL �d, k� = sit2 ∙ �q�0A−ds02 + ∑ �ϑ�iτA+niτA ∙(δ − d)�tτ=1 �σA�2 + ∑ �ϑ�iτD+niτD ∙(δ − d)�tτ=1 (σD)2 + 
                                     ∑ �ϑ�iτU−niτU ∙k∙max(0,T−τ)�tτ=1 (σU)2 + ∑ �ϑ�iτW−niτW∙k∙max(0,T−τ)�tτ=1 (σW)2 � +
                                      k ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ , 
where ϑ�iτ
A~N�niτA ∙ θi,�niτA ∙ σA�, ϑ�iτD~N�niτD ∙ θi,�niτD ∙ σD�, ϑ�iτU~N�niτU ∙ (θi + κ ∙
interventτ),�niτU ∙ σU�, and ϑ�iτW~N�niτW ∙ (θi + κ ∙ interventτ),�niτW ∙ σW�. Thus, ϑ�iτA , ϑ�iτD , ϑ�iτU , 
and ϑ�iτ
W
 do not depend on d and k.  
Since qitL �d, k is normally distributed and E�qitL �d, k� is a linear function of d and k, the 
unconditional distribution of qitL  is normal too. We use Equation A.4 to derive the unconditional 
mean E�qitL � and variance Var�qitL �. Because by definition E�qitL � = ∫ E�qitL �d, k�f(d)f(k)𝑑𝑑d 𝑑𝑑k 
and since E�qitL �d, k� is linear in d and k (see Equation A.4), the unconditional mean of qitL  can be 
found by replacing d and k in Equation A.4 with d� and k�: 
(A.5) E�qitL � ≡ qitL = E�qitL �d = d�, k = k�� = sit2 ∙ �q�0A−d�s02 + ∑ �ϑ�iτA+niτA ∙�δ − d���tτ=1 �σA�2 + 
                              ∑ �ϑ�iτD+niτD ∙�δ − d���tτ=1 (σD)2 + ∑ �ϑ�iτU−niτU ∙k�∙max(0,T−τ)�tτ=1 (σU)2 + ∑ �ϑ�iτW−niτW∙k�∙max(0,T−τ)�tτ=1 (σW)2 � +
                              k� ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ . 
As becomes clear from Equation A.5, q�0A, d�, and δ cannot be separately identified. Therefore we 
estimate q�0 and d�∗ with q�0= q�0A − d� (i.e., the unconditional initial mean quality belief about θi) 
and d�∗ = δ − d�. 
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 Next, we derive Var�qitL �, that is, the consumers’ uncertainty at time  t – given the signals 
received by that time – about the average monthly quality over the next L months. To find Var�qitL �, notice that we can write Equation A.4 as: 
 (A.6)  E�qitL �d, k� = Fit + Git ∙ (δ − d) + Hit ∙ k, 
with Fit = sit2 ∙ �q�0A−δs02 + ∑ ϑ�iτAtτ=1�σA�2 + ∑ ϑ�iτDtτ=1(σD)2 + ∑ ϑ�iτUtτ=1(σU)2 + ∑ ϑ�iτWtτ=1(σW)2 �, Git = sit2 ∙ � 1s02 + ∑ niτAtτ=1�σA�2 +
∑ niτ
Dt
τ=1(σD)2 �, and Hit = ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ − sit2 ∙ ∑ niτU ∙max(0,T−τ)tτ=1 (σU)2 − sit2 ∙ ∑ niτW∙max(0,T−τ)tτ=1 (σW)2 . 
Using the law of total variance Var(X) = E(Var(X|Y)) + Var(E(X|Y)) (Weiss, 2005), we can now 
derive Var�qitL � as follows: 
(A.7) Var�qitL � ≡ �sitL�2 = E(sit2) + Var(Fit + Git ∙ (δ − d) + Hit ∙ k) 
         = sit2 + Git2 ∙ �sd�2 + Hit2 ∙ �sk�2, 
where the last equality is based on the fact that sit2  does not depend on d and k, Var(δ − d) =
�sd�2, and Var(k) = �sk�2. 
 Derivation of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Consider a consumer who, at time t, has to decide on whether or not 
to accept a three-month free trial offer. Let LR be the length of the contractual period if he adopts 
the service after the trial, and let �si(t+3)R �2 be the consumer’s uncertainty at time t + 3 about the 
average match quality during the contractual period of LR months, starting in month t + 4.  
To assess the likely reduction in �si(t+3)R �2 as a result of the expected usage intensity 
during the trial, the consumer needs to assess �si(t+3)R �2 with and without usage signals, and 
compute the difference.  Notice that, in line with Equation A.7: 
(A.8)  �si(t+3)R �2 = si(t+3)2 + Gi(t+3)2 ∙ �sd�2 + Hi(t+3)2 ∙ �sk�2, 
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with Gi(t+3) = si(t+3)2 ∙ � 1s02 + ∑ niτAt+3τ=1�σA�2 + ∑ niτDt+3τ=1(σD)2 �, Hi(t+3) = ∑ max�0, T − (t + 3 + τ)�LRτ=1 LR⁄ −
si(t+3)2 ∙ ∑ niτU ∙max(0,T−τ)t+3τ=1 (σU)2 − si(t+3)2 ∙ ∑ niτW∙max(0,T−τ)t+3τ=1 (σW)2 . Note that a consumer can only predict 
�si(t+3)R �2 because, in month t, she does not know the true values of ni(t+k)A , ni(t+k)D , ni(t+k)U , and ni(t+k)W  for k = 1, 2, 3. In our model, the consumer predicts ni(t+k)A  and ni(t+k)D  using the average 
monthly number of past advertising and direct marketing signals, ∑ niτAtτ=1 t⁄  and ∑ niτDtτ=1 t⁄ , 
repectively. For ni(t+k)U , we assume that the consumer has a notion of her likely monthly use rate. 
We compute this likely use rate as the consumer’s average monthly usage across her subscription 
months. For those consumers who never subscribed to the service, we predict the likely use rate 
with a loglinear regression of zaps on age, average income, household size, and relationship 
length, calibrated on the data of actual IDTV users. Of course, predicting Var�qi(t+3)R � in the 
absence of usage signals is a matter of setting ni(t+k)U  to zero. For ni(t+k)W , the consumer first 
computes the average monthly increase in WOM,  ∆n����itW = �nitW − ni1W� (t − 1)⁄ , and then 
predicts ni(t+k)W  as nitW + k ∙ ∆n����itW. Finally, to obtain URit, we center each customer’s series of 
uncertainty reduction values around the value in the first period, such that URit only captures 
within-consumer cross-time variation in anticipated uncertainty reduction. 
Web Appendix 2: Robustness of the Reduced Form Approach 
The reduced-form approach has important advantages over the structural approach. For one, it 
uses a closed-form expression for the “expected value function” or the “gain from trial,” which is 
easy to interpret and speeds up estimation time (Ching et al., 2011). Moreover, it avoids the 
identification difficulties that typically come with a fully structural approach (Ching et al., 2013), 
especially if the value outcomes of consumers’ decisions are not directly observed (as is the case 
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here: we do not observe the utility that consumers derive from service adoption). However, our 
reduced form approach also comes with limitations. In reality, the expected gain from trial may 
be more complex than only a linear function of the expected uncertainty reduction (see Equation 
1). Specifically, our model ignores any interactions between the expected uncertainty reduction 
and the level of the quality beliefs (Ching et al., 2011). The estimated coefficient of our reduced-
form uncertainty reduction (which is constant for a given consumer) does not capture this, and 
thus represents some average effect across observations. To assess the accuracy and robustness 
of the reduced form, we run a simulation in which we compare the anticipated uncertainty 
reduction due to trial, URit (see Web Appendix 1), with the anticipated benefit of trial as 
obtained in a structural forward-looking approach. We first describe the structural model and 
then discuss the simulation results.  
Structural model. We consider a consumer at time t, who has not adopted the service yet, 
but has the opportunity to benefit from a trial offer. She knows that accepting the trial will also 
have consequences beyond the trial period, in that it will allow her to make a more informed 
decision on whether or not to fully adopt at time t + 3 (after the trial expired). In our reduced 
form approach, this is captured by including the anticipated uncertainty reduction URit, i.e., the 
drop in uncertainty about the average match quality during a subsequent paid contractual period, 
due to trial usage. 
In the structural approach, the consumer evaluates the extent to which subscribing to the 
free trial affects the expected utility three months from now. If V�i,t+3R(After Trial) refers to the 
consumer’s estimated systematic utility from adopting the regular paid service after first having 
used the trial (see Equation 2), and given that the utility of not accepting the paid offer is always 
scaled to zero, the expected maximum utility in t + 3 can be found as ln �exp�V�i,t+3R(After Trial)� +
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1� (Train, 2009). Similarly, ln �exp�V�i,t+3R(Without Trial)� + 1� is the expected maximum utility in t 
+ 3 when the consumer did not first use a trial. The future gain from trial is then obtained as the 
difference between these two expressions, which we henceforth refer to as DVit. 
The challenge is to correctly derive V�i,t+3R(After Trial) and V�i,t+3R(Without Trial). In line with 
Equations 2 and 4, we write: 
(A.9)   V�i,t+3R(After Trial) = βi0 − exp �−r �q� i(t+3)R(After Trial) − r �s�i(t+3)R(After Trial)�2 2� �� + βiFE + X�i(t+3)βiX 
and 
(A.10)   V�i,t+3R(Without Trial) = βi0 − exp �−r �q� i(t+3)R(Without Trial) − r �s�i(t+3)R(Without Trial)�2 2� ��, 
   +βiDISCDISC�i(t+3) + X�i(t+3)βiX. 
where q� i,t+3R(After Trial) and s�i,t+3R(After Trial) are the anticipated mean and standard deviation of the 
consumer’s belief regarding the service quality during a regular contract, after first having used a 
three-month trial. Similarly, q� i,t+3R(Without Trial) and s�i,t+3R(Without Trial) are the anticipated mean and 
standard deviation of her belief regarding the service quality during a regular contract starting in 
three months, without first having subscribed to a free trial. Notice that we assume the consumer 
knows the coefficients of the utility functions. Also, she is aware of the fact that, after a trial, she 
is excluded from any discounts. However, for all other elements of the utility functions, the 
consumer is relying on estimates. This is particularly challenging for q� i,t+3R(After Trial), q� i,t+3R(Without Trial), s�i,t+3R(After Trial), and s�i,t+3R(Without Trial), which are the outcome of an anticipated 
learning process. In Web Appendix 1, we already explained how �s�i,t+3R(After Trial)�2 and 
�s�i,t+3R(Without Trial)�2 can be derived (they form the basis for the computation of URit). For the 
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derivation of q� i,t+3R(After Trial) and q� i,t+3R(Without Trial), we rely on Equation A.5 (see Web Appendix 1). 
Specifically, notice that: 
(A.11)      q� i,t+3R(After Trial) = �𝐬𝐬�𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝟑𝟑𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐢𝐢𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀 𝐓𝐓𝐀𝐀𝐢𝐢𝐓𝐓𝐓𝐓�𝟐𝟐 ∙ �q�0A−d�s02 + ∑ �ϑ�iτA+niτA ∙�δ − d���+∑ �ϑ�𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐀𝐀 +𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐀𝐀 ∙�δ − ?̅?𝐝��𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏 �tτ=1 �σA�2  
  + ∑ �ϑ�iτD+niτD ∙�δ − d���+∑ �ϑ�𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐃𝐃 +𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐃𝐃 ∙�δ − ?̅?𝐝��𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏 �tτ=1 (σD)2  
  + ∑ �ϑ�iτU−niτU ∙k�∙max(0,T−τ)�tτ=1 +∑ �ϑ�𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐔𝐔 −𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐔𝐔 ∙?̅?𝐤∙𝐦𝐦𝐓𝐓𝐦𝐦(𝟎𝟎,𝐓𝐓−𝐢𝐢−𝛕𝛕)�𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏 �(σU)2  
  +  ∑ �ϑ�iτW−niτW∙k�∙max(0,T−τ)�+∑ �ϑ�𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐖𝐖 −𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐢,𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕𝐖𝐖 ∙?̅?𝐤∙𝐦𝐦𝐓𝐓𝐦𝐦(𝟎𝟎,𝐓𝐓−𝐢𝐢−𝛕𝛕)�𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏 �tτ=1 (σW)2 � 
  + k� ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − 3 − τ)Rτ=1 R⁄ , 
with 
(A.12) �s�i(t+3)After Trial�2 = � 1sit2 + ∑ 𝐧𝐧�𝐢𝐢(𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕)𝐀𝐀𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏�σA�2 + ∑ 𝐧𝐧�𝐢𝐢(𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕)𝐃𝐃𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏(σD)2 + ∑ 𝐧𝐧�𝐢𝐢(𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕)𝐔𝐔𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏(σU)2 + ∑ 𝐧𝐧�𝐢𝐢(𝐢𝐢+𝛕𝛕)𝐖𝐖𝟑𝟑𝛕𝛕=𝟏𝟏(σW)2 �−1. 
The expressions for q� i,t+3R(Without Trial) and �s�i,t+3Without Trial�2 are analogous, except that they do not 
account for learning from usage signals.1 Notice that the components in bold can only be 
estimated since they involve information that is unknown to the consumer in month t. For the 
derivation of s�i,t+3After Trial, she only needs to estimate the numbers of signals ni,t+τA , ni,t+τD , ni,t+τU , 
and ni,t+τW  during the next three months, e.g., on the basis of her signal history or consumer 
characteristics (see Web Appendix 1). The derivation of the components in bold between the 
1 In the third term of the expression for q� i,t+3R(After Trial) we can in principle leave out ∑ �ϑ�iτU − niτU ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T −tτ=1
τ)� because, in the current analysis, we focus on consumers who consider to accept or not accept a trial in t without 
having used the service before and, thus, who have not received any usage signals before t + 1. 
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square brackets is more complex because not only is the consumer unaware of the exact values 
of the quality signals during the next three months, she does not even know the distributions that 
generate these signals. Thus, the consumer cannot use the real signal-generating distributions to 
integrate out the quality signals.  
Let us first discuss ∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τA + nı,t+τA ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 �  and ∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τD + nı,t+τD ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 � , 
capturing the impact of the corrected advertising and direct marketing signals in months t + 1, t + 
2, and t + 3. From Web Appendix 1, we remember that, in principle, ϑ�i,t+τA ~N�ni,t+τA ∙
θi,�ni,t+τA ∙ σA� and ϑ�i,t+τD ~N�ni,t+τD ∙ θi,�ni,t+τD ∙ σD�, but the consumer does not know ni,t+τA , 
ni,t+τD , or her real ultimate match quality θi. In our structural model, she therefore replaces ϑ�i,t+τA  
and ϑ�i,t+τD  with ϑ�i,t+τA  and ϑ�i,t+τD , where ϑ�i,t+τA �qit~N�n�i,t+τA ∙ qit,�n�i,t+τA ∙ σA� and 
ϑ�i,t+τD �qit~N�n�i,t+τD ∙ qit,�n�i,t+τD ∙ σD�, and qit is the consumer’s current belief with regard to 
the ultimate match quality. The consumer’s assessment of ∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τA + nı,t+τA ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 �  and 
∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τD + nı,t+τD ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 �  is further complicated by the fact that she does not know δ, the 
real marketing bias. Instead, she therefore relies on her bias belief d~N�d�, sd�. In summary: 
(A.13)  ∑ �ϑ�ı(t+τ)A + nı(t+τ)A ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 � ≡ ∑ �ϑ�i(t+τ)A + n�i(t+τ)A ∙ �d − d���3τ=1  and 
(A.14)  ∑ �ϑ�ı(t+τ)D + nı(t+τ)D ∙ �δ − d���3τ=1 � ≡ ∑ �ϑ�i(t+τ)D + n�i(t+τ)D ∙ �d − d���3τ=1 . 
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Similar observations pertain to the expressions 
∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τU − nı,t+τU ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1 �  and ∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τW − nı,t+τW ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1 � , 
capturing the impact of the corrected usage and WOM signals in months t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. 
According to our derivations in Web Appendix 1, it should hold that ϑ�i,t+τU ~N�ni,t+τU ∙
(θi + κ ∙ interventt+τ),�ni,t+τU ∙ σU� and ϑ�i,t+τW ~N�ni,t+τW ∙ (θi + κ ∙ interventt+τ),�ni,t+τW ∙
σW�. However, the consumer does not know the numbers of signals ni,t+τU  and ni,t+τW , the true 
ultimate match quality θi, and κ ∙ interventt+τ, i.e., the extent to which the current match quality 
differs from the ultimate match quality. Therefore, she replaces ϑ�i,t+τU  and ϑ�i,t+τW  with ϑ�i,t+τU  and 
ϑ�i,t+τW , where ϑ�i,t+τU �qit, k~N�n�i,t+τU ∙ �qit + k ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�,�n�i,t+τU ∙ σU�, 
ϑ�i,t+τW �qit, k~N�n�i,t+τW ∙ �qit + k ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�,�n�i,t+τW ∙ σW�, qit, like before, is the 
consumer’s current belief with regard to the ultimate match quality, and k~N�k�, sk� is the belief 
with regard to the monthly quality change. In summary, we have: 
(A.15) ∑ �ϑ�ı(t+τ)U − nı(t+τ)U ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1 � ≡ ∑ �ϑ�i(t+τ)U − n�i(t+τ)U ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1  
and 
(A.16) ∑ �ϑ�ı,t+τW − nı,t+τW ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1 � ≡ ∑ �ϑ�i,t+τW − n�i,t+τW ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1 . 
In the structural model, the consumer derives the expected utility gain from trial by 
integrating out ∑ �ϑ�i,t+τA + n�i,t+τA ∙ �d − d���3τ=1 , ∑ �ϑ�i,t+τD + n�i,t+τD ∙ �d − d���3τ=1 , ∑ �ϑ�i,t+τU −3τ=1n�i,t+τU ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�, and ∑ �ϑ�i,t+τW − n�i,t+τW ∙ k� ∙ max(0, T − t − τ)�3τ=1  from DVit =
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ln �exp�V�i,t+3R(After Trial)� + 1� − ln �exp�V�i,t+3R(Without Trial)� + 1�. Relying on the principles that 
we also used in Web Appendix 1, we can derive the unconditional distributions for each of those 
four expressions. Because the derivations, though similar in nature to those in Web Appendix 1, 
are lengthy and tedious, we do not completely report them here. In our computation of DVit, we 
draw from the unconditional distributions to integrate out those four quantities. 
Simulation. To assess the robustness of URit, we examine its cross-time correlation with 
DVit. Specifically, we consider a consumer with mean values for the (heterogeneous) parameters 
and socio-demographic, discount, usage, advertising, and direct marketing variables, and month-
specific average values for the WOM measure. For this “average consumer,” we assess URit and 
DVit over the simulation horizon and find a correlation of .94. If we only consider the months in 
which the trial was actually available, the correlation even further increases to .99. To assess the 
robustness of URit against changes in usage, we vary usage intensity from the bottom tenth 
percentile to the top tenth percentile by increments of 10% and find the correlation between URit 
and DVit to remain virtually unaffected. Hence, the reduced-form expression for the forward-
looking component (URit) provides a good approximation of the structural “gain from trial,” 
even for trial timings that are not actually observed, and for different levels of use rate. This 
instills confidence in the approximation, and suggests that it can be safely used for policy 
simulations. To further check the sensitivity of our results to URit, we rerun the policy 
simulations while systematically increasing or decreasing the impact of URit in Equation 1 by 
20%. Although this influences the amplitude of the simulated effects, it leaves our insights 
regarding the role of timing and usage unaffected. 
Web Appendix 3: Identification of Model Parameters 
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We first discuss the identification of the exponential Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) 
specifications (see Equations 3 and 4) and the underlying learning process, and then deal with the 
remaining coefficients in Equations 1 and 2.  
Identification of the parameters of the CARA specification and underlying learning 
process. The identification of the distribution parameters of ri is aided by the fact that, in the 
CARA specification, ri interacts with the variance of the consumer’s quality belief �sitL�2. In 
contrast with the mean of the consumer’s quality belief qitL  (which fluctuates with the random 
signal draws), the belief variance declines monotonically. Because ri interacts with �sitL�2, a 
decrease in variance will result in a stronger utility increase for customers with a high risk-
aversion parameter than for less risk-averse customers. This dependence on the evolution of the 
belief variance sets (the heterogeneity in) the risk aversion parameter apart from (the 
heterogeneity in) the intercept and the ultimate match quality (which will be discussed below). 
Furthermore, notice that all consumers are assumed to start with the same quality belief (mean 
and variance) such that differences in behavior in the early periods can be explained mainly by 
differences in risk aversion, all else equal (Narayanan & Manchanda, 2009). 
The identification of the distribution parameters of the ultimate match quality θi is 
complicated by two factors. First, consumers do not base their decisions on the belief qit about θi 
as such, but on the belief about the average actual quality during the (trial or regular) 
subscription (thereby taking into account that this actual quality may change over time). This 
belief about the average actual quality, given by qitL = qit + k ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ , is 
only a function of the belief qit about θi. Second, the means of the corrected quality signals 
(θi + d�∗ for advertising and direct marketing and θi + κ ∙ interventt − k� ∙ max(0, T − t) for 
usage and WOM), which are used to update qit, do not necessarily correspond to θi: that is, 
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consumers may over- or undercorrect for possible signal bias. To solve the first concern, notice 
that, as a consumer cumulates signals, her belief qit about θi converges and the belief’s variance sit2  tends to zero.2 When convergence has been reached, changes in the belief qitL  merely depend 
on the passage of time (captured by ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)Lτ=1 L⁄ ), which enables us to separate 
consumers’ belief k~N�k�, sk� from qit.3 
With regard to the second concern, we point out that our dataset offers sufficient 
variation to separate the ultimate match quality θi from the signal bias (correction) parameters d∗~N�d�∗, sd�, κ, and k. The heterogeneity in θi (as captured by its standard deviation σθ) can be 
assessed by comparing consumers who collected the same numbers of signals at the same points 
in time, such that differences in behavior cannot be due to differences in the information set. 
Notice that our dataset indeed includes clusters of consumers with very similar signal patterns. 
For example, 1,317 consumers in our dataset received neither direct marketing nor usage signals 
(before adoption) and each of them can be matched with (up to 8) consumers living in the same 
census block such that they received exactly the same numbers of advertising and WOM signals 
at any given point in time. For consumers with similar signal patterns, the impact of d*, κ, and k 
is comparable such that we can attribute differences in quality beliefs to heterogeneity in θi. 
Furthermore, given σθ, it is possible to separate d�∗ from the average ultimate match quality θ by 
comparing households with the same usage and WOM signal patterns but with different total 
numbers of advertising and/or direct marketing signals; toward the end of our observation period 
2 Because consumers leave the dataset once they adopt the paid service or opt out after a free trial, there will be 
consumers for which qit never converges. However, we note that 79% of the consumers do not adopt and 78% of 
the service subscription observations occur in the second half of our observation period. In other words, there is 
substantial variability in the dependent variable at a moment that many consumers’ quality beliefs qit about ultimate 
match quality may have converged. 
3 In the CARA specification, expectation and variance operate mathematically independently, such that both k� and sk can be identified. Furthermore, for the identification of k, we can rely on the complete consumer sample because 
k is not heterogeneous. 
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(when convergence in qit has been reached), the confrontation of cross-sectional differences in 
subscription behavior with cross-sectional differences in the total number of advertising and 
direct marketing signals will reveal the average extent d�∗ to which consumers over- or 
undercorrect for marketing bias. That is, the belief qitL  of consumers with larger total numbers of 
marketing signals will be affected by d�∗ to a greater degree. For example, in month 19; 5,058 of 
the consumers who have not adopted yet can be matched with (up to 13) consumers with 
identical (zero-)usage and WOM signal patterns but substantially different total amounts of 
direct marketing (average within-cluster variance is 16.322). Similarly, we can compare 
consumers with the same total numbers of advertising and direct marketing signals but with 
different usage and/or WOM signal patterns. Toward the end of the observation period, such 
comparison helps us disentangle the impact of κ and k�. More specifically, the belief of 
consumers who received a large number of usage and WOM signals at some earlier point t, will 
be affected more by the net signal correction κ ∙ interventt − k� ∙ max(0, T − t) than the belief of 
consumers who received fewer signals at the same point in time. For example, in month 19; 
1,836 of the consumers who have not adopted yet, have the same advertising and direct 
marketing history but very different usage and WOM patterns: the average within-period cross-
consumer variance is 17,910.253 for the monthly number of WOM signals and 310.125 for the 
monthly number of usage signals. The parameter κ can be distinguished from k� because the 
number of actual interventions (which identifies κ) does not smoothly follow the function max(0, T − t) (which identifies k�). This becomes clear from Figure A.1 which displays the 
evolution of the onsite repair intervention rate and max(0, T − t). 
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Figure A.1: Data Pattern for Onsite Repair Interventions and max(0, T − t)
 
 
Given the other learning parameters, the cross-time subscription behaviors, combined 
with the substantial variation in the numbers of signals (see illustrations in Figures A.2 and A.3), 
help us identify the signal standard deviations σA, σD, σU, and σW (Coscelli & Shum, 2004). 
During the first months after launch, the free trial was not available yet, and WOM was limited. 
In addition, as indicated before, many consumers did not receive any direct marketing. For them, 
advertising and adoption data from the first months help identify the standard deviation σA of the 
advertising signals. Given σA, we can use direct marketing and adoption data for consumers who 
did receive direct marketing during the first nine months to identify the standard deviation σD of 
the direct marketing signals. Subsequent changes in consumers’ adoption as they receive usage 
and WOM signals help us identify how much they learn from these signals.  Since many 
consumers learned through WOM and not usage (almost 85% of the consumers did not subscribe 
to a trial), we can disentangle the standard deviations σU and σW of the usage and WOM signals. 
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 Figure A.2: Temporal Variation in Number of Quality Signals 
 
 
Figure A.3: Cross-sectional Variation in Number of Accumulated Quality Signals in Month 124 
a) Direct Marketing b) Usage c) WOM 
   
 
In a similar way, the combination of consumers’ subscription behavior and the numbers 
of quality signals allows us to identify the standard deviations of the bias beliefs, sd and sk. As 
indicated by Mehta, Chen, & Narasimhan (2008a, 2008b), the standard deviations of the bias 
4 As indicated in Table 1, the cross-sectional variation in advertising is very limited. 
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beliefs capture the correlations between the corrected signals, and thus have an impact on the 
signals’ informativeness: the higher the bias uncertainty, the higher the variance shared by the 
corrected signals, and thus the lower the informativeness of a set of corrected signals, relative to 
a set of completely independent signals. While a comparison of marketing and non-marketing 
quality sources (e.g., advertising versus WOM) sheds light on the informational value of a single 
signal (as captured by the signal standard deviations, see above), a comparison of different signal 
numbers for a given signal source reveals the decrease in the marginal informational signal value 
as the number of signals increases. In other words, a comparison of different signal numbers 
reveals the correlation between subsequent signals and thus enables us to assess sd and sk (see 
Mehta, Chen, & Narasimhan, 2008a). 
 Finally, an advantage of our study context is that we start observing all consumers 
directly after service launch such that we do not face the “left-truncation problem” in which 
information about initial conditions is lacking. As a result, the observations in the early months 
are particularly helpful in the identification of some of our parameters. Specifically, in our 
model, all consumers start with the same initial quality belief N(q�0, s0) about ultimate match 
quality where s0 is .01. Shortly after launch, this belief is hardly affected by any quality signals.5  
On the basis of Equations A.5 and A.7, we find that, without quality signals, the consumer’s 
expected service quality qitR~N�q�itR , sitR� has the following mean and variance:  
(A.17)   q�itR = q�0 + k� ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)LRτ=1 LR⁄  
(A.18)  �sitR�2 = s02 + �sd�2 + �∑ max(0, T − t − τ)LRτ=1 LR⁄ �2 ∙ �sk�2. 
5 Initially, the trial was not available yet (such that people could not collect usage signals before adoption), 
consumers obviously received few WOM signals, there were almost no direct marketing contacts, and the per capita 
advertising investment was limited and identical for consumers in a given region – in one region, the advertising 
investment in the first month was zero. 
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As a consequence, the part of the utility function that captures the impact of the quality belief 
(see Equation 4) can be written as: 
(A.19) −exp �−ri �q�itR − ri �sitR�2 2⁄ �� = −exp �−ri ∙ �q�0 + k� ∙ ∑ max(0, T − t − τ)LRτ=1 LR⁄ � 
   +ri2 ∙ �(. 01)2 + �sd�2 + �∑ max(0, T − t − τ)LRτ=1 LR⁄ �2 ∙ �sk�2� 2� �. 
The to-be-estimated parameters in this expression are q�0, k�, sk, sd, r∗ and σr∗  (the latter two 
being the parameters of the heterogeneity distribution of the risk aversion parameter ri). Notice 
that the functional form of Expression A.19 and the fixed value of s0 (= .01) identify the scale 
and location of the heterogeneous risk aversion parameter ri. That is, it is not possible to nullify 
changes in r∗ or σr∗  by compensating changes in the other parameters. Moreover, because 
∑ max(0, T − t − τ)LRτ=1 LR⁄  changes as a function of time, we can also disentangle q�0, k�, sd, and sk.  
Identification of the remaining coefficients in the utility equations. Separate identification 
of the informative and persuasive effects of advertising and direct marketing stems from the fact 
that, while the persuasive impact on customer utility at a given point in time is fixed, the 
informative effect is not: a customer that received more signals in the past, has become more 
certain about the service’s ultimate quality, and learns less from new incoming advertising and 
direct marketing signals. Hence, the portion of the marketing communication impact that dies 
down as the consumer learns tends to be the informative effect, and the portion that persists 
relates to the persuasive effect (Mehta, Chen, & Narasimhan, 2008b).  
The constant term and the coefficients of the (free and paid) trial dummies can be 
separated from the exponential CARA expression because, for a given consumer, they contribute 
to utility in the same way at any point in time, whereas the role of the CARA expression depends 
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on the number of quality signals received and the passage of time. The coefficients of the two 
dummy variables that capture preceding trial (free or paid) do not interfere with the CARA 
expression either, because their effect persists even when a consumer’s usage during the trial 
(and thus learning through usage) is limited. 
The time trend in the utility functions can be separated from any trending patterns in the 
learning part, because it has a fixed utility effect at any point in time, irrespective of the type and 
number of signals received by a customer. Finally, the coefficients of the household 
characteristics (age, income, household size, and relationship length), the uncertainty reduction 
variable, the price-discount variable, and the competitive advertising variable can be identified 
easily on the basis of observed variation in these variables. 
Importantly, next to analyzing the intuition underlying the parameter identification, we 
also constructed an artificial dataset on the basis of the original independent variables and found 
that our code was able to recover the true relationships with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
Web Appendix 4: Log Likelihood Function of Main Model 
(A.20) LL = ∑ ln �∫ �∏ �PitF�υitF �PitR�υitR�PitN�υitNTit=1 �10,000i=1  
 ∙ f�βi0�α0,αZ;σβ0�f�βi|β;σβ�f�ri∗|r∗;σr∗�f�θi|θ;σθ� 
 ∙ f�ϑiA,ϑiD,ϑiU,ϑiW�d∗, κ, k�;σA,σD, σU,σW�d�βi0,βi, ri∗, θi,ϑiA,ϑiD,ϑiU,ϑiW�� 
where Ti is the number of observations for consumer i; υitF , υitR, and υitN indicate whether the 
consumer chose the free trial, the regular offer, or the no-purchase option in month t; βi refers to 
the vector of consumer-specific response coefficients, except for βi0 (see Equations 1, 2, and 15); 
ϑi
A is a vector containing consumer i's (unconditional) corrected advertising signal sums 
ϑi1
A , … ,ϑiTiA ; similarly, ϑiD = ϑi1D , … ,ϑiTiD , ϑiU = ϑi1U , … ,ϑiTiU , and ϑiW = ϑi1W, … ,ϑiTiW ; β is the 
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vector of population means for the consumer-specific response coefficients βi; r∗ and θ are the 
population means of the consumer-specific parameters ri∗ and θi; σβ0 ,σβ,σr∗ , and σθ are the 
population-level standard deviations of βi0,βi, ri∗, and θi, respectively; and f(.)  refers to a normal 
density function. The other symbols are defined in the text. 
Web Appendix 5: Robustness of Usage, WOM, Advertising, and Direct Marketing Effects 
A possible concern is that the quality signals are not exogenous or pick up latent phenomena 
which may bias the results. First, usage may depend on perceived quality such that consumers 
use the service more intensively when quality beliefs improve. This could result in an 
overestimation of the usage signals’ effects. Because quality beliefs improve over time, usage 
endogeneity would likely surface in the form of increasing usage rates. Yet, if anything, there 
appears to be a minor decrease in usage intensity: the correlation between usage and the trend 
variable equals −.038. Usage endogeneity therefore does not seem to be a major concern in our 
context. 
Second, the number of WOM signals (i.e., the number of subscribers surrounding a given 
consumer) may be a proxy for certain omitted consumer characteristics that correlate with 
service subscription, if people living in the same area are akin. However, we explicitly control 
for the effects of several important socio-demographics; moreover, our measurement of WOM is 
not constrained to a limited geographic band around each consumer but also captures the 
influence of more remote, and possibly very different, consumers. Another concern is that the 
estimated effect of WOM could be biased by network externalities when service quality 
improves as a function of the number of adopters, for example, due to increased viewer 
participation in live TV shows. In the studied setting, however, this sort of user interaction is 
virtually nonexistent because the provider does not produce TV content.  
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Third, advertising, which in principle is region-specific, could capture unobserved 
region-specific demand shifts. However, the variation in advertising spending across regions 
turns out to be negligible such that this risk in practice does not exist.  
Fourth, direct marketing could be cross-sectionally correlated with the error term of the 
adoption equation due to targeting. However, because the firm is not likely to target its 
communication based on (full) information about the individuals’ propensity to adopt, but, 
rather, on household characteristics like socio-demographics or relationship length that we 
control for, we do not expect this to be a problem (see Narayanan & Manchanda, 2009 for a 
similar argument). Still, to check for this possible source of endogeneity, we followed Mundlak 
(1978) and Risselada, Verhoef, and Franses (2014) and included the consumer-specific average 
direct marketing level as a covariate. The pattern of results (in particular the informative and 
persuasive effects of direct marketing) remained largely unchanged. 
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